Audit log
The Audit Log page — reading and filtering the append-only trail of privileged operator actions. What's recorded on each event, how to filter by outcome, and an honest note on the tamper-evidence claim.
Audit log
The Audit Log page is the record of privileged operator actions across the
control plane. It's gated by the audit.view privilege — without it the page
shows a locked state ("You need the audit.view privilege to read the audit
log.").
Privileged operator actions record an event here: issuing or revoking a
license, starting or stopping impersonation, changing
launch mode or simulation, opening a web-SSH session, and mesh / load-balancer /
slot / SSH-key / tunnel operations. (Tenant and brand changes are not
currently written to the trail.) The
convenience recorder (audit()) derives the actor from the session, the
on-behalf-of identity from any active impersonation, the launch mode from
the session, and the IP from request headers — and it's best-effort, so an
audit failure never breaks the action it was recording.
What the page shows
Four KPI stats summarize the current window: Events (total), Succeeded, Denied, and Errors (the last two accented when non-zero). A line above the table reports when the most recent entry was recorded.
The table lists each event newest-first:
| Column | Notes |
|---|---|
| When | Timestamp |
| Actor | The operator's email; an ⟶ on-behalf-of line appears when the action ran under impersonation |
| Action | The action key (e.g. license.issue, license.revoke) |
| Target | What it acted on (a license id, tenant, etc.) |
| Outcome | success / denied / error |
| IP | Source IP, or — when unavailable |
| Launch mode | god / beta / production at the time |
The page reads the most recent events (up to a fixed limit, newest first). It degrades gracefully: if the audit table hasn't been created yet on a fresh database, the page shows an empty trail rather than erroring.
Filtering and export
Above the table, outcome filters — All · Success · Denied · Error — narrow the rows client-side, each showing its own count. Filtering is instant and in-page; it doesn't re-query.
Export produces a slice of the currently filtered events. In the current build this is a toast confirmation ("Audit slice exported… written to a tamper-evident bundle") rather than a file download — treat it as a prototype export affordance, not a finished data-export pipeline.
Append-only — and an honest note on "tamper-evident"
The audit trail is append-only: events are only ever inserted, never edited
or deleted, and the in-memory backend keeps them newest-first by prepending. The
Postgres schema (schema-audit-events.sql) is a flat insert-only table, and the
recorder never issues an update or delete.
The page's UI copy describes the log as hash-chained, write-once, and tamper-evident — each entry "sealing" the one before it. Be aware that, in the current implementation, this is aspirational UI language, not a property the storage layer enforces yet: the schema is "append-only by convention" with no hash-chain, sealing, or prev-hash column, so alterations at the database level are not cryptographically detectable today. Read the log as a faithful append-only record of what operators did — the tamper-evidence guarantee is a stated design goal the schema doesn't yet back.
Related
- What generates most events → Licensing (admin) and Identity & access (impersonation, web-SSH sessions)
- How actor / on-behalf-of / launch mode are set → god-mode overview